Felkins v. City of Lakewood by Briscoe, Judge Mary Beck
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
ADAAA Case Repository Labor and Employment Law Program 
12-19-2014 
Felkins v. City of Lakewood 
Judge Mary Beck Briscoe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa 
Thank you for downloading this resource, provided by the ILR School's Labor and Employment 
Law Program. Please help support our student research fellowship program with a gift to the 
Legal Repositories! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Labor and Employment Law Program at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in ADAAA Case Repository by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Felkins v. City of Lakewood 
Keywords 
Cynthia Felkins, City of Lakewood, 13-1415, failure to accommodate, Disability, government, Employment 
Law, ADA 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa/340 
  
  
PUBLISH 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 TENTH CIRCUIT 
  
   
CYNTHIA FELKINS, 
 
 Plaintiff - Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF LAKEWOOD, 
 
           Defendant - Appellee. 
 
 
No.  13-1415 
 
 
  
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
 (D.C. No. 1:11-CV-03390-MSK-KMT)  
       
 
Robert M. Liechty, Cross Liechty Lane PC, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Plaintiff - 
Appellant 
 
Alan Epstein (Thomas J. Lyons, Mark S. Ratner, and Matthew J. Hegarty, with him on 
the brief), Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant - Appellee  
 
       
 
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, HARTZ and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. 
  
 
HARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
       
  
FILED 
United States Court of Appeals 
Tenth Circuit 
 
December 19, 2014 
 
Elisabeth A. Shumaker 
Clerk of Court 
 2 
 
Plaintiff Cynthia Felkins, formerly an emergency dispatcher for the City of 
Lakewood, Colorado, alleges that she suffers from a condition called avascular necrosis 
that qualifies as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12213 (2012), and that the City refused to accommodate that disability.  She 
brought suit against the City under the Act, but the district court granted the City 
summary judgment.  We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.  
Ms. Felkins’s claim fails because she presented no expert medical evidence that any of 
her major life activities have been substantially limited by avascular necrosis. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Avascular necrosis is a rare condition that can cause bone tissue to die from poor 
blood supply.  Ms. Felkins alleges that she suffers from the condition and that she so 
informed the City during her initial interview for an emergency-dispatcher job when she 
told her interviewers that she could not lift more than ten pounds because of her 
condition.   
Ms. Felkins began working for the City in October 2007, resigned a month later, 
but was then rehired in June 2008.  In December 2008 her femur fractured while she was 
at work.  According to Ms. Felkins, she was driven to the hospital by her supervisor, Jodi 
Malpass, and on the way she told Ms. Malpass that her femur broke because she suffers 
from “a bone disease that results in the death of bone tissue due to a lack of blood supply 
to the bone.”  Aplt. App. at 66. 
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After her surgery Ms. Felkins called Ms. Malpass, allegedly to explain that the 
procedure had been more complicated than anticipated and healing would be delayed.  
Later that day, Ms. Malpass emailed Ms. Felkins’s other supervisors, writing that the 
surgery “went well” and that the doctors repaired Ms. Felkins’s femur using bone from a 
cadaver.  Id. at 70.  A physician assistant completed two forms related to Ms. Felkins.  
The first was a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) document (though Ms. Felkins 
was not eligible for FMLA benefits) indicating that Ms. Felkins had received hospital 
care but did not have a chronic condition.  The second was a note stating only “Return to 
work full duty 1/7/09.”  Id. at 37. 
Ms. Felkins returned to work in early January 2009, using crutches or a wheelchair 
to get around as her femur healed.  The healing femur caused significant pain.  
Consequently, Ms. Felkins and Ms. Malpass agreed that Ms. Felkins would work up to a 
full ten-hour shift gradually, starting with four hours per day and increasing the number 
of hours over time.  In late February Ms. Felkins met with all three of her supervisors, 
including Ms. Malpass, to further discuss her pain issues.  At no time did Ms. Felkins 
request a disability accommodation in the form of reduced work hours, although she 
asserts that she had no reason to make the request because she believed that the City was 
aware of her disability and had already provided the reduced work hours as an 
accommodation.  To support the accuracy of her belief, she states that Ms. Malpass knew 
that Ms. Felkins’s ex-husband had to do the grocery shopping because Ms. Felkins could 
not, and that one of her supervisors knew she had handicapped plates on her car.   
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Between January and April 2009, Ms. Felkins missed a significant number of 
work hours.  She never resumed a full ten-hour shift, making it only to eight hours.  In 
early March she took a one-week vacation—though she alleges that the City approved.  
In late March she tripped over her dog and aggravated her femur injury, causing her to 
miss three days of work; and in early April she sustained a broken pelvis in a car 
accident, causing her to miss two more days of work.   
On April 8 the City called and fired her.  Ms. Felkins alleges that the City told her 
she was terminated because she had used too much leave, that she responded that she was 
willing to work a full shift to keep her job, and that the City did not pursue her offer.  The 
City followed up with a termination letter, stating that Ms. Felkins was being fired 
because she had “used an inordinate amount of leave as a probationary employee” and 
had failed to “demonstrate[] the ability to consistently report for her shifts.”  Id. at 60–61.  
Included with the letter was a chart showing that Ms. Felkins had taken 466 hours of paid 
and unpaid leave since starting her job ten months earlier.  Id. at 61.  She states that the 
City never told her before she was fired that she needed to work more hours.  The City 
does not appear to contest this.  Nonetheless, the City maintains that its official policy 
requires emergency dispatchers like Ms. Felkins to work a ten-hour shift four days a 
week to meet minimum staffing requirements, and that a dispatcher’s failure to do so 
burdens other employees and places the public at risk because of a decreased capacity to 
handle emergency calls.   
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After her termination Ms. Felkins filed a discrimination charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and received a right-to-sue letter.  She 
filed her complaint in December 2011 in the United States District Court for the District 
of Colorado, alleging that the City had discriminated against her in violation of the ADA 
by failing to accommodate her disability of avascular necrosis.  A year later Ms. Felkins 
moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and submitted a declaration under 
penalty of perjury asserting that her avascular necrosis caused her femur to break.  
Shortly thereafter the City moved for summary judgment on both liability and damages, 
contending that Ms. Felkins had failed to demonstrate both that she has a disability and 
that the City discriminated against her on the basis of disability.  Regarding the failure to 
prove a disability, it asserted that “[n]either the doctor’s note allowing her to return to 
work, the FMLA paperwork filled out by Plaintiff’s physician [assistant], nor her 
testimony, establish a recognizable disability under the ADA.”  Id. at 9–10 (citations to 
exhibits omitted).  In response, Ms. Felkins submitted two declarations in which she 
asserted her disability from avascular necrosis.  The City replied that she lacked the 
medical training to assess the cause of her broken femur.   
The district court denied Ms. Felkins’s motion and granted the City’s, holding that 
(1) the only evidence of Ms. Felkins’s disability was her own testimony, which was not 
enough to show that her alleged condition was substantially impairing, and (2) no 
evidence showed that Ms. Felkins requested—or the City offered—an accommodation 
for a disability as opposed to a temporary work-hour adjustment because of Ms. Felkins’s 
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postsurgery pain.  See Felkins v. City of Lakewood, No. 1:11-cv-03390-MSK-KMT, 2013 
WL 5200901, at *5–6 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2013). 
On appeal Ms. Felkins argues that she presented sufficient evidence of her 
disability and that the City failed to provide her an accommodation because of that 
disability.  Because we reject the first of her contentions, we have no need to address the 
second. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.”  R.W. Beck, 
Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1142 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In resisting summary judgment, “[a] party 
asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to 
particular parts of materials in the record, including . . . affidavits or declarations.”  Id. 
56(c)(1).  “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made 
on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that 
the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”  Id. 56(c)(4). 
B. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Disability 
The ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), including by “not making reasonable accommodations 
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to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate 
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business of such covered entity,” id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  Thus,  
to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that [s]he (1) is a disabled person as defined by 
the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to 
perform the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) suffered 
discrimination by an employer or prospective employer because of that 
disability. 
 
 EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1037–38 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
This case turns on the first prong—whether Ms. Felkins is a disabled person.  
Under the ADA, “[t]he term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual—(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities 
of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such 
an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).  Because Ms. Felkins does not contend that she 
had a record of an impairment or that the City regarded her as impaired, her sole claim is 
one for actual impairment under paragraph (A).  Hence, she “must (1) have a recognized 
impairment, (2) identify one or more appropriate major life activities, and (3) show the 
impairment substantially limits one or more of those activities.”  Carter v. Pathfinder 
Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Among the major life activities in the ADA are walking, standing, and lifting, 
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and “the operation of a major bodily function, including . . . normal cell growth [and] . . . 
circulatory . . . function[s].”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 In district court Ms. Felkins consistently identified her disabling impairment as 
avascular necrosis.  Her complaint stated:  “Ms. Felkins suffers from avascular necrosis 
. . . .  Her impairment substantially limits her ability to do . . . major life activities . . . .”  
Aplt. App. at 2 ¶ 4 (emphasis added).  Likewise, her motion for partial summary 
judgment stated that “[b]ecause of her avascular necrosis,” she could not walk normally 
and her major bodily functions of normal cell growth and blood circulation were also 
substantially impaired.  Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 4, Felkins, No. 1:11-cv-03390-
MSK-KMT (Nov. 13, 2012).  And her response to the City’s motion for summary 
judgment said that her “avascular necrosis substantially impairs her major bodily 
functions of normal cell growth and normal blood circulation,” Aplt. App. at 53, and that 
her condition also substantially affected her lifting, walking, and standing.  After this 
recitation the response concluded, “Clearly, her avascular necrosis was an ADA 
disability.”  Id. at 54.1  Therefore, Ms. Felkins had to present sufficient evidence to prove 
                                                 
1 In her reply brief on appeal, Ms. Felkins argues for the first time that her disabling 
impairment is, alternatively, her broken leg.  But this is too late to raise an issue.  See 
Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Generally, an 
appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”); Coleman v. 
B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It is not 
sufficient to merely mention an issue in a reply brief.  Issues not raised in the opening 
brief are deemed abandoned or waived.”). 
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(1) that she has a condition (namely, avascular necrosis) (2) that substantially limits at 
least one of her five identified major life activities.2  We hold that she did not. 
None of the medical evidence in the appellate record supports Ms. Felkins’s 
allegation that she has avascular necrosis or details the degree to which it affects her 
major life activities.  After Ms. Felkins’s surgery, a physician assistant filled out an 
FMLA form stating that Ms. Felkins did not have a chronic condition.  That same 
physician assistant later wrote a note stating only “Return to work full duty 1/7/09.”  Id. 
at 37.  There is no mention of avascular necrosis, much less a description of its effects on 
Ms. Felkins.   
That leaves only Ms. Felkins’s own declarations.  She states that she has avascular 
necrosis and told others that she has the condition.  She also asserts that the condition 
caused her femur fracture, that it complicated her femur surgery, and that it caused her 
alleged difficulties walking, standing, and lifting.  
Such lay evidence, however, is inadmissible in court and thus cannot be used to 
oppose summary judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).  Ms. Felkins does not claim to 
be a medical expert, so her opinion testimony on a medical issue cannot be “based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”  Fed. R. Evid. 701.  For example, 
                                                 
2 Ms. Felkins argues that the City concedes that she has avascular necrosis.  We do not 
think that is a fair characterization of the City’s brief in this court.  But in any event it 
cannot be doubted that the City has vigorously argued that Ms. Felkins has not produced 
evidence of any substantial limitation of a major life activity caused by her alleged 
avascular necrosis.   
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“a lay witness with experience could testify that a substance appeared to be blood, but . . . 
[he] would have to qualify as an expert before he could testify that bruising around the 
eyes is indicative of skull trauma.”  Id. advisory committee’s note, 2000 Amendments.  
And we have said that a lay witness may testify to someone’s “unusual, abnormal or 
bizarre conduct” and opine on his sanity, United States v. Goodman, 633 F.3d 963, 968–
69 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), but not to his “manic depressive 
state,” United States v. Walshe, 526 F. App’x 834, 839 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis 
omitted).  Other examples from this court predate the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the 
common law that they apply matches Rule 701.  See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 
160–61 (1995) (plurality opinion) (“Where the Rules [of Evidence] did depart from their 
common-law antecedents, in general the [Advisory] Committee said so.”).  In Franklin v. 
Shelton, 250 F.2d 92, 97 (10th Cir. 1957), we said: 
[W]here injuries complained of are of such character as to require skilled 
and professional persons to determine the cause and extent thereof, they 
must be proved by the testimony of medical experts, but . . . a lay witness is 
competent to testify concerning those physical injuries and conditions 
which are susceptible to observation by an ordinary person. 
 
In that case a car-accident victim was held competent to testify about such matters as her 
difficulties focusing her left eye, her now-irregular menstrual cycle, and her children’s 
postaccident nervousness, but not competent to testify that her son had suffered a 
punctured lung and two broken ribs or that her eye condition had been caused by the 
accident.  See id. at 97–98.  Similarly, we have held that a lay witness could testify to 
someone’s night sweats, continuous coughing, and gradual weakening, see United States 
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v. Monger, 70 F.2d 361, 363 (10th Cir. 1934), but only an expert could testify to whether 
a patient’s tuberculosis “is incipient or has been arrested,” United States v. McShane, 70 
F.2d 991, 996 (10th Cir. 1934). 
These evidentiary principles apply, of course, to ADA claims.  Ms. Felkins’s 
declarations are admissible insofar as they describe her injuries and symptoms, such as 
pain and difficulties walking, standing, and lifting.  They are inadmissible, however, 
insofar as they diagnose her condition as avascular necrosis or state how that condition 
causes limitations on major life activities, for those are clearly matters “beyond the realm 
of common experience and . . . require the special skill and knowledge of an expert 
witness.”  James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC, 658 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Ms. Felkins argues that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, lowered the standard of proof for disability claimants and 
relieves her of the obligation to provide expert testimony.  The ADAAA conveyed “the 
intent of Congress that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA 
should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, 
and . . . that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the 
ADA should not demand extensive analysis.”  Id. § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.  Thus, 
regulations implementing the ADAAA (though not yet in effect when Ms. Felkins was 
fired) provide that “[t]he comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life 
activity to the performance of the same major life activity by most people in the general 
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population usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(v) (2011).  We are not saying, however, that Ms. Felkins failed to show 
that her performance of a major life activity is significantly lower than that of others.  
Rather, the failure of proof on which our decision turns is that she has not provided 
proper evidence that any limitation she may have is caused by avascular necrosis. 
Ms. Felkins also argues that the City concedes on appeal the admissibility of her 
declarations and that it did not timely raise its admissibility argument in district court.  
The first argument misrepresents the City’s position.  Its appellate brief first contends that 
Ms. Felkins’s declarations are an attempt to create “a sham fact issue,” in contradiction to 
her deposition testimony, Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986), a 
contention we need not address, and then contends that even assuming that they are not a 
sham, the declarations do not provide adequate evidence.  Ms. Felkins misreads the 
assuming-not-a-sham sentence as a concession of admissibility. 
As to the second argument, Ms. Felkins was on notice of the need to provide 
admissible evidence in district court.  After she filed her motion for partial summary 
judgment and an accompanying declaration stating that her avascular necrosis caused her 
femur fracture, the City’s motion for summary judgment challenged her status as 
disabled, stating:  “No evidence in this matter indicates the femur fracture resulted from 
any disability.  Neither the doctor’s note allowing her to return to work, the FMLA 
paperwork filled out by Plaintiff’s physician [assistant], nor her testimony, establish a 
recognizable disability under the ADA.”  Def. City of Lakewood’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 
 13 
 
4–5, Felkins, No. 1:11-cv-03390-MSK-KMT (Dec. 20, 2012) (citations to exhibits 
omitted).  The City thus fulfilled its “initial responsibility of informing the district court 
of the basis for its motion,” the absence of evidence establishing a fact on which the 
nonmovant had the burden of persuasion.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986).  “[A] movant that will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial need not negate 
the nonmovant’s claim.  Such a movant may make its prima facie demonstration simply 
by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element 
of the nonmovant’s claim.”  Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 
1998) (citation omitted).  The City was not obligated to state what evidence would create 
a genuine issue of material fact.  In response to the City’s motion, it was Ms. Felkins’s 
burden to “set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of 
trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for [her].”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  This burden was not satisfied. 
In short, Ms. Felkins has failed to present admissible evidence that she suffers 
from avascular necrosis that has caused any of her claimed limitations of walking, 
standing, and lifting, or of enjoying normal cell growth or circulatory function.  The 
district court properly granted summary judgment. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
